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omehow unexpectedly, 2005 may become the year with 
the most numerous and substantial reforms per unit of time 
in Romania after 1989. In its first days in office the cabinet 
adopted a bold and business-friendly tax reform based on 
the flat rate, marking a strategic change in the country's 
fiscal policy. The property and judiciary reform package laws proposed 
by the cabinet in the first semester are finally putting and end to the 
long and protracted processes of restituting and de facto 
guaranteeing the property, by closing loopholes and redressing past 
injustice; or to the previous tendency to preserve the old habits and 
discredited people in the judiciary under new, EU-acceptable disguise. 
Standards of integrity in public life have risen with the adoption of the 
new declarations of assets and interests for all dignitaries, magistrates 
and civil servants. Media is again free to criticize the government 
openly, without fearing economic retaliation, which most of them do 
with gusto, due to the "no-hidden-subsidy" policy embraced by the 
cabinet in its early days. Another complex legislative package was 
announced for September, advancing the process of decentralization 
both in terms of functions and financial resources. Finally, Romania's 
foreign policy has become interesting again, under the energetic and 
unconventional president Băsescu. And we are still in the first half of 
2005. 
True, the sense of urgency is determined first and foremost by the 
tougher stance of Brussels, which demands substantial results before 
the country report comes out this fall. Moreover, Bucharest does not 
always have resources to back its new ambitions (for example, in 
foreign policy), and the coordination across sectors or between 
institutions (for instance, between the cabinet and the Parliament) is as 
weak as ever, which creates implementation problems. But the 
renewed energy and thrust are visible. This report begins by 
commending, in the paragraph above, the ruling coalition for its 
agenda and determination. The rest of the material is rather critical, 
aimed at identifying weak points in some of the policies mentioned 
and offering recommendations.  
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Foreign Policy 
THE PRIDE WELL TEMPERED 
Does the capacity of Romanian foreign policy match 
the ambitions of her new president? 
This analysis deals with the structural problems of Romania's foreign 
policy, not with current events, and offers recommendations from this 
perspective. The problems identified are the shortage in human 
resources and the inconsistent personnel policy; the absence of any 
assistance strategy from the part of a country with regional ambitions; 
and a mismatch between priorities and resources. 
The problem of human resources 
Compared with her neighbors, Romania is not a small state. We are 
actually the largest country in the Balkans, with everything that follows 
from here: biggest economy, largest army, longest borders, the most 
numerous seats in the European Parliament. With Central Europe 
included, we come on the second place after Poland. Does this mean 
we are prepared to follow in the steps of Poles in terms of influence in 
Europe, courage to promote an agenda of foreign policy, and not just 
speak about it (in case someone did not notice, the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine had two important sponsors: USA, through its 
many democracy-promotion foundations, and Poland, as an 
advanced – and somehow lonely – outpost of Europe)? If we do not 
strengthen substantially the basis of our foreign policy, the answer is no. 
In spite of the spectacular take-off of President Băsescu, who made 
headlines in the international media and confounded at least two or 
three members of hard core Europe, our foreign policy is still lacking 
the solid fundaments of a serious international player. And as long as 
this situation lasts, nobody should be too enthusiastic about, or 
frightened of, our foreign policy, because we do not have resources to 
push our projects much beyond their launching stage. 
First of all, we are short of human resource and expertise. When have 
you last read a good material written by someone in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs or by an independent institute, on any topic related to 
foreign policy, which shed a new light or came with a solution to a 
problem? Our scarce production in this respect is strictly formal and 
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void of meaningful content. Our universities do not produce regional 
experts. There is no specialist on Balkan issues in Romania, bar a 
handful of linguists, so nobody could offer informed views on TV during 
the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia. The same is true about Middle East, 
Russia, Caucasus. And things are equally dramatic in the case of EU, 
where we have only a number of youngsters who are still in universities 
there, or have graduated recently. The former opposition parties, now 
in power, have a responsibility for not investing in networking at the 
European level, being totally absorbed by their unequal political 
struggle with the Social Democrats (the current opposition). However, it 
is not their fault that Romanian universities have always cut the budget 
of area studies departments, or that our international relations faculties 
consist mainly of diplomats, lawyers and generalists, not real experts in 
one field or another. Who is to be blamed that every minister has to run 
trainings with the diplomacy using curricula copied from countries with 
which we have little in common, but avoids to hit the nail in the head – 
i.e. how the diplomats are recruited in the first place, based on clan 
and connections, not merit and vocation? Finally, as no regime 
manages to stifle entirely all the talents, some good people have 
made it into the ministry. But nobody makes the difference between 
them and the rest of the crowd, those who take an appointment in an 
embassy as the old Socialist writers were going on state-sponsored 
holidays in villas at the Black Sea, with the belief that the state owes 
them something due to some personal merit.  
Without recruitment rules and long-term training programs, no 
difference in treatment between good and bad people, no strategic 
plan, and no government or non-government expert community with 
the practice of strategic thinking, our embassies are bound to remain 
travel agencies for Romanian dignitaries and visa offices for foreigners 
coming to Romania – and even the latter function is sometimes too 
much for them. The whole ministry actually is often no more than the 
government's travel office, although real diplomatic work should be 
done between high level visits, which merely stamps the 
accomplishments of experts and diplomats. 
Second, we are short of resources and without an established tradition 
of foreign policy: assistance. Small wonder then that Romania made 
one of the smallest contributions to the relief effort after the tsunami in 
Asia. Effective assistance policy does not necessarily mean lots of 
money, and not all of them should be public funds, as Poland showed 
last year in Ukraine. The resources may come in the form of expertise or 
networking, but we are short of these ourselves and not very skilled in 
using them. For us, foreign policy means almost exclusively official 
delegations. Our involvement in Moldova may be an exception, but 
even there we have made mistakes with our assistance. There is no 
department for assistance abroad in the Romanian government and 
no plan to establish one. We want to assume the role of a large 
country and important regional player, but mentally we remain a 
donor recipient.  
 
Our embassies 
function 
largely as 
travel offices 
for dignitaries 
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The problem of priorities 
Since we have only a few skilled diplomats, even fewer bureaucrats, 
and almost no experts, our capacity to prepare, debate and adopt an 
informed policy, and back it with an action plan is very low. 
Exceptional tasks such as the presidency of OSCE stretch to the limit 
this capacity. So prioritization is even more important in Romania than 
elsewhere, because without it there are insufficient resources to reach 
significant goals.  
If one examines the first, rather hectic, months of this administration, 
with the new directions launched by the Presidency, the signing of the 
EU accession treaty and the Iraq hostage crisis, and compares the 
events with the resources available (to the extent they can be 
assessed from outside), may conclude that our first priority is the Black 
Sea strategy of the president. The launching of this strategy made 
waves, demonstrated our willingness to become an active partner for 
the big actors and draw the attention to us in the Western capitals (not 
always to our advantage, should we say). There have been three 
stages in the Romanian foreign policy towards the Black Sea so far, 
under three different administrations, so probably the interest for this 
area is justified. Dan Căpăţână, advisor to the former president Emil 
Constantinescu (1996-2000), was right to dream of the oil pipeline 
across the Black Sea from Caucasus to the Constanţa harbor; Mircea 
Geoană, the previous minister of foreign affairs (2001-2004), was right 
to lend a hand in promoting the new Georgia to the Western world; 
and the current president Băsescu is surely right in drawing Europe's 
attention to the continent's Eastern frontier, which is very important and 
should not be left out of the radar screens.  
But let us examine the results of these efforts. The famous oil pipeline is 
still a distant prospect, and so is the one by-passing Russia through 
Ukraine. The only certainty is the oil route through Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, which is why these two countries are treated equally well by 
Americans, even though one is a clannish republic and the other an 
orange semi-democracy. Since we have first begun to speak about 
the Black Sea project, about seven years ago, Europe's dependence 
of Russian energy has increased, not decreased; in natural gas this 
dependence is almost as high as Moldova's. As a result France and 
Germany are very prudent in their relations with Putin, and follow a 
different line on the Chechen issue than the US. The new Georgian 
president has allowed himself to be carried away by his early success 
in taking control over the rebel region Ajaria, and made the same bold 
move last year against the breakaway South Ossetia. He 
miscalculated, however, since Moscow was not very interested in 
Ajaria, while in South Ossetia almost everybody has a Russian passport 
and relatives in Northern Ossetia, which is part of the Russian 
Federation. Georgia backed off, and it became immediately obvious 
that nobody, even the Americans, was ready to support it openly 
against Russia. On the contrary, Tbilisi was instructed that they shouldn't 
rock the boat. And this happened despite the fact that Georgia is an 
interesting country, with harbors at the Black Sea and oil transit on its 
territory – of which the Republic of Moldova has none. Moldova still 
Do we have a 
plan for 
Transnistria, 
acceptable to 
the EU? 
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does not have an EU representative to cover it permanently, although 
the matter has been discussed for some time and formally approved 
(no money were found). By contrast the Caucasus is full of Western 
diplomats and aid organizations, and the whole OSCE mission in 
Georgia is sponsored by the EU. 
Although the advance of democracy in countries like Georgia and 
Ukraine play into the hand of the US, who wants to by-pass Russia and 
open the Central Asia's energy sources to the world market, this policy 
had also perverse effects. It mobilized the Russians behind their flag 
and made the Europeans make a step back. The EU has no reason to 
open new battle fields as long as they have enough problems on the 
existing ones, such as the Baltic countries' border with Russia or the 
enclave of Kaliningrad. The last EU-Russia summit in Moscow brought 
little progress on the big issues as far as Europe is concerned, so there is 
little appetite to start addressing small ones like Transnistria. Therefore 
our current policy to get them involved in Moldova, which is our 
second national priority, has at this moment the same chances as the 
oil pipeline of the former presidential advisor Căpăţână: they should 
not be entirely ruled out for the future, but none is likely to happen 
soon.  
What is left is our welcome effort to define a regional common interest. 
But we are not a donor country, so what can Romania do? Do we 
have a brilliant plan to sort out things in Transnistria, other than the 
economic embargo, which has never toppled an illegitimate regime? 
Are we prepared to persuade Moldavians to give up Transnistria in 
order to join Europe – or Europeans to accept a second Cyprus? 
Frankly, we are not. To change the European policy towards Russia, 
which is very much sailing against the wind, one has to be very influent 
in the Western capitals. Such a task requires resources and the 
identification of the right incentives for the Europeans if they are to go 
down this road. We haven't seen anything remarkable yet from 
Bucharest in this respect, and after the last year's victory in Moldova, 
when the Kozak plan was stopped in the last minute, no genuine 
positive development has occurred concerning Chişinău. 
Briefly, our foreign policy needs much more concrete steps in all these 
areas, and a good management of expectations. It deserves to be 
supported, but do not hold your breath for immediate results – anyway, 
not during the lifetime of a single government. And then, can this be 
our first priority? No. We need to gain more influence in Europe first if 
the Black Sea project is to be successful. If we convince the Europeans 
that we know what we do and that we are able to handle this job on 
their behalf, perhaps we can keep them engaged in the Black Sea. 
After all, we must do what Poland did for Ukraine and will do for 
Belarus. But if we only hang on Europe's coat-tails without providing 
ourselves any added value, they will perceive us as merely promoting 
the US interests in the region and avoid taking a tougher stance on 
Russia just for our sake. 
 
 P O L I C Y  W A R N I N G  R E P O R T  −  M A Y  2 0 0 5  
 
9 
We must become more influential in Europe 
Our main priority is therefore to become more influential in Europe. 
Otherwise Europe will not back us in our Eastern endeavors. Right now 
we have serious problems with our image in countries like Germany, 
Netherlands or Great Britain, which are still to ratify our accession 
treaty, and our prime minister is not on first name terms with many 
European leaders when they meet in the European Council. To be 
more influential in the East, Romania must become a competent and 
respected member of the EU, but we do not qualify on any of these 
qualities yet. The prime minister sends shivers down our spines when he 
says the cabinet members must get training – not briefing – from the 
Ministry of Integration before they meet their European counterparts. 
Mircea Geoană, currently the opposition leader, also makes warm 
pleas, including to his own party, to send to Brussels as observers MPs 
who will not bring discredit to the country. Hungary, Poland and the 
Baltic states sent exceptional teams, often first class people recruited 
from outside politics.  
If we want to have a decent representation in Brussels in 2008, and a 
reasonable level of turnout and public awareness in the first European 
elections, we should start to act now. Our presence in Brussels in the 
first quarter of 2005 was rather weak, save for the human sympathy 
and support mobilized by the Minister of Justice Monica Macovei 
during her visits. Our mission there is not active enough, ministries back 
home did not manage to arrive at one person per ministry who would 
master the whole integration file and send instead to Brussels armies of 
civil servants each in charge of one paragraph of the acquis. Good 
impact studies to help us prepare better for accession are still to be 
produced1. 
Recommendations and evaluations 
Who is responsible for the shaky foundations of our foreign policy? Not 
the current minister, who only took office recently; and not the current 
president, though his ambitions make even more visible the contrast 
between what we want and what we can do. But the previous 
ministers – people of good quality, which is not the case in other 
departments – have all a responsibility for not taking decisive steps to 
solve the systemic problems mentioned above, some of which are 
shared with the rest of the public administration. For example, the lack 
of connection between performance and salary, the lack of clear 
standards for recruiting and promotion, the shortage of expertise and 
strategic capacity. In other words our foreign affairs leadership should 
focus not only on outflows – appointments abroad, current affairs – but 
also on inputs. We recommend, without any pretension to be 
exhaustive, that: 
• MFA should set up a competent strategy compartment, which is 
currently missing. 
                                                 
1 The sectoral studies of the European Institute qualify only partly: such a study 
must offer an explanatory model as a basis for policies, not just descriptive 
analysis.  
First priority: 
become more 
competent in 
order to be 
more influential 
in Europe 
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• MFA should create a network of Romanian experts in foreign affairs 
in Romanian and Western universities. It should seek to influence the 
study and career choice of at least a fraction of the thousands of 
students leaving every year for Western universities, through 
scholarships and contracts. When such a system was previously 
created (at the National Institute for Administration; and through 
the Government's Scholarship Program) the returning graduates 
were not accepted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This should not 
happen again. 
• A genuine human resource policy should be finally enacted in the 
MFA to recruit, train and monitor the career of diplomats, 
irrespective of who governs the country. Without such a system the 
promotions and replacements will remain politicized, and the 
diplomats will be motivated primarily to avoid annoying their bosses 
instead of producing results. 
• A comprehensive audit should be performed on the structure and 
functioning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at home and abroad, 
with the purpose to adjust the commitment in resources to the 
strategic goals adopted. The Ministry often complains it does not 
have enough personnel, but when comparing Romania with other 
small countries with a very efficient diplomacy, the numbers are not 
that bad. What is probably not optimal is their allocation by 
function and geographical area. We should ask ourselves if we 
really need a separate network of commercial trade 
representatives to promote investments in Romania, when this can 
actually be a performance indicator for the embassies; or whether 
we need so many missions in developing countries, when issuing 
visas can be more cheaply administered by mail.  
Such recommendations are aimed at addressing the structural 
problems of the diplomatic machinery. But the priorities should be 
screened in a similar manner, clear objectives set and the overall 
assessment of the Ministry done against such benchmarks. Again, 
without trying to include all areas in our brief analysis, we recommend 
the following order of priorities: 
1. Get favorable votes when EU-Romania treaty is ratified in EU 
member state national parliaments. Romania was caught on the 
wrong foot with the French and Dutch negative votes in the 
referendums on Constitution. Not the fault of Romania, of course, 
but neither did Romania, in its vulnerable position, lend a hand to 
the yes campaigns. In the weeks of intense campaigning in France, 
when the scare of eastward enlargement was riding high, we, 
Romanians, the traditional friends of France, should have been 
rallying behind the Oui camp. How could we have been so 
conspicuously absent? The Iraq hostage crisis is no excuse, since in 
a functioning state one office deals with hostages and another with 
the EU. Moreover the hostage crisis was managed – effectively, it 
seems – by the Presidency, not the government. 
2. Continue negotiations to avoid a second-class status for Romania in 
the EU. It is unacceptable that with less than two years to accession 
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the Romanians still need a visa for Britain, for example, and there is 
no firm prospect of abolishing it. The arguments of the British party 
all concern illegal migration, so are practically irrelevant. Illegal 
migration is perpetuated by restrictive visa regimes. It should be 
tackled with targeted police measures, not general policies. After 
the first wave of accession a whole research literature was 
published on this topic, and it is surprising Romania does not make 
use of it to promote a more sustained offensive against the visa 
regimes. Generally speaking, visa policies are blind, breeding 
corruption and raising obstacles for honest travelers, not for the 
traffickers. Romania also requires visas on a number of countries 
that are hardly a threat, such as Australia, and did so prior to it 
Schengen negotiations. Until it becomes a full Schengen member, 
Romania should drop visas for Commonwealth countries and lobby 
more intensely the UK for them to abolish the visa for Romania. Or if 
not, claims to a special relationship should be given up. 
The British visa is only one example. Here we can avoid the free 
labor exemptions that some old EU members plan to impose on us, 
longer than those applied to the first-wave countries? We should 
strive for better conditions on a bilateral basis with as many EU 
countries as possible, first because it is in our best interest to have 
Romanians working abroad, second because we should not get 
worse deals than Central European did. 
3. Prepare for a successful Romanian presence in Brussels, and 
improve the quality of the network of bureaucrats working on EU 
issues inside the government. This task cannot be accomplished by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone, therefore the work must be 
done in cooperation with the Ministry of Integration, the PM office, 
political parties and the civil society. However, MFA can and should 
be the spearhead of this initiative. 
4. Create a strategy for the Europeanization of the Black Sea region. 
This cannot be done overnight with the level of expertise currently 
available in Romania – but on the other hand, six months after the 
initial idea was launched, it is hard time to feed it with more than 
just speeches. No clear action plan exists and this new direction of 
Romanian foreign policy risks remaining on paper only.  
The new stress of our foreign policy, as presented by president Băsescu 
draws on a higher awareness of Romania's weight in international 
affairs and on a renewed national pride. And we support that. 
However, the president should also understand that teachers 
encourage assertive students when they are the best and brightest, 
not when they are laggards. A cabinet with ministers who need basic 
training in EU affairs is not likely to impress anyone in Brussels. Moreover, 
this boldness fits well the president, who is elected by the majority of 
Romanians, but not necessarily every Romanian politician or 
bureaucrat, irrespective of age and position, who risks being 
perceived as arrogant. To support our new regained pride we need to 
increase our competence. Our pride is well-deserved: we fought 
against an attempt to steal our 1989 revolution; we did not resign with 
British visa 
regime should 
be a test case 
of diplomatic 
effectiveness 
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our corruption even when some representatives of Europe appeared 
to turn a blind eye, and we have made a terrific journey from the 
country of Ceauşescu to the one that signed the EU accession treaty 
last month. However, this pride should be tempered by the awareness 
that there is still a very long way to go for our third-rank sized country to 
attain a first class foreign policy, on the model of small countries like 
Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland or the Netherlands.  
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Fiscal Policy 
THE FLAT TAX WORKS 
As SAR predicted two years ago that it would 
In August 2003 SAR initiated a series of publications in support of the 
introduction of the flat tax in Romania. For one year and a half we 
campaigned forcefully for this idea – more precisely for: (i) eliminating 
the progressive taxation on personal income; (ii) broadening the tax 
base, by including as many sources of personal income as possible 
under the coverage of the single flat tax; (iii) eliminating the existing 
and proposed exemptions; and (iv) reducing the rate on corporate 
profit in order to align it with the new personal income rate. Other 
organizations and opinion leaders picked up on this idea, and even 
the previous Social Democratic government contemplated it for a 
while, until the conservative wing of the party struck it down thinking it 
may be unpopular with their voters. During the electoral year 2004, 
however, the center-right opposition alliance, encouraged by our 
campaigning and the public acclaim that greeted the same type of 
fiscal reform implemented in Slovakia, decided to make the flat tax a 
central piece of their electoral campaign.  
After the fiercely contested elections of November 2004, several weeks 
were needed to sort out the cliff-hanger. Eventually the center-right 
alliance emerged as a winner (somehow to its own surprise), and 
moved swiftly to form the government. There was not much time for 
policy analysis: the cabinet was sworn in on December 28th and they 
had to adopt the fiscal reform package before the end of the year in 
order for it to become effective in January 2005, and not one year 
later (under the “stability” provision of the Code, any substantial 
amendment applies only beginning with the following calendar year).  
As a result the changes were discussed and passed as an emergency 
ordinance in the last days of December. They were centered in the 
hallmark figure of 16%. The idea was to bring down to this level the 
taxes which were above it, and increase those below it, in order to 
make the whole system more neutral and entrepreneurial-friendly. The 
most important and visible direct taxes in Romania were both 
substantially reduced: on corporate profit from 25% to 16%; and on 
personal income by abolishing the old progressive scheme with a 
marginal rate of 40% and replacing it with a flat one of, bien sûr, 16% 
(Fig. 1). Simple and neat, to the delight of any Western conservative 
think tank and the despair of some EU governments.  
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On top of that, a whole range of deductions and exceptions were 
eliminated (some of them only proposed by the previous government, 
but never actually applied), for both direct and indirect taxation. And 
the tax on gains from interest or stock market transactions was raised 
from the previous level of 1%, while the special turnover tax on micro-
enterprises doubled, from 1.5% to 3%.  
Fig. 1. The fiscal reform of January 2005 
 Before After 
Corporate profit tax 25% 16% 
18% up to 60 
€/month* 
23% up to 150 
€/month 
28% up to 230 
€/month 
34% up to 325 
€/month 
 
 
Personal Income Tax 
40% above 325 
€/month 
 
 
16% 
*average salary in 2005:   240 €/month 
 
After only four months since the reform was introduced it is too early to 
pass a final judgment on the success of this policy. Moreover, the 
package is still not perfectly neutral since intermediate transitory 
regimes with rates lower than 16% were accepted for a period of one 
year for gains from bank deposits, dividends and the capital market, 
while the special tax regime for micro enterprises will be phased out 
until 2007. 
Still, there are strong signals that the flat tax works, in Romania like 
everywhere else, as SAR has argued all along. The Laffer effect of the 
rate reduction is most visible in the case of the corporate tax, where 
obviously the supply side theory functions (Fig. 2). But even in personal 
income the drop in collection is much smaller than what the 
government – and, especially, the IMF – expected after such a 
significant drop in rates. The overall increase of revenues to the state 
budget, in real terms, in the first five months of this year against the 
same period of 2004 is 4.7% (Fig. 3).  
Moreover, the increase above the rate of inflation of the sums 
collected at the Social Security Fund (Fig. 2), where contributions are 
defined as fixed percentages of the salary, suggest that some jobs 
have indeed moved from the underground into the official sector and 
started to pay income and wage taxes to the budget. The authorities 
estimated their number to about 100,000. If correct, this represents a 
2.5% increase for the official sector, achieved most likely at the 
expense of the informal one.  
Budget 
revenues have 
indeed 
increased after 
the tax cuts… 
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A second positive effect which is hard to measure exactly comes from 
the elimination of the tax return forms and the reporting procedure for 
the employees who have just one source of personal income. Out of 
the 2.9 million taxpayers with reporting obligations in 2002, it is 
estimated that around 80% will disappear from the system following this 
simplification. Starting with 2006 all these people will stop submitting 
forms to the tax authorities, therefore time and administrative effort will 
be saved in both the public and the private sectors. However, these 
benefits will only accrue in the following years.  
 
 
Fig. 2. General consolidated budget, before and after 
the fiscal reform
Real terms: inflation discounted, fixed 2004 exchange rate
* the tax rates modified by the fiscal reform
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200
CORPORATE PROFIT*
PERSONAL INCOME*
VAT
Excises
Custom duties
Other
Social security fund
Unemployment fund
Local budgets-own
mil €
Q1 04
Q1 05
Fig. 3. Total revenues of the state budget 
(unconsolidated), real terms, first 5 months
0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000
Jan-May 04
Jan-May 05
bn. Rol
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Problems 
A lot of the criticism following the fiscal reform and directed at the 
Ministry of Finance was, in our opinion, wrong-headed. When the 
opposition and the media denounced the "tax increases that offset 
the effect of the flat tax", this was largely a knee-jerk reaction based 
on a superficial understanding of the principle of fiscal neutrality. As we 
showed above, prior to these changes the capital gains or gambling 
were much less taxed in Romania than salaries, which was absurd. 
What is more, the existing and planned exemptions were benefiting 
mostly people with high or multiple sources of income. The reform did 
indeed reduce the average tax burden, while in the same time 
broadening the tax base by eliminating these exemptions and the 
disproportionately low rates on certain sources of income. It is the merit 
of the government that they withstood the pressure of interest groups 
(for example, the producers of goods and services that were VAT 
exempt) and invested a lot of political capital in this reform. 
Having said this, it is also true that the changes were not well managed 
by the cabinet and a lot of uncertainty was generated by the hesitant 
actions of the Ministry of Finance and the lack of support by some top 
government officials. Time pressure is an explanation, but not an 
excuse, for the erratic implementation of the fiscal reform. 
• While the general idea of the reform was clear from the beginning 
for whoever wanted to see it, the specifics included in the 
secondary legislation came long after January 1st, when the Fiscal 
Code was supposed to become effective. In fact, some parts of 
the Code come into effect only at the beginning of June, after the 
Parliament discussed and amended it in several sections. 
• Even more serious than the delay are the loopholes introduced by 
the Parliament in the regime of taxing the gains from real estate 
transactions (introduced for the first time). By amending the law in 
key points they created the possibility for real estate owners to play 
with the date on the contracts, or set up transfer schemes between 
individuals, or individuals and companies, so as to avoid the tax on 
gains completely. Since in Romania politicians are often blamed for 
enriching themselves by accumulating land and buildings, it is 
difficult to regard these amendments as honest mistakes. Unless 
these loopholes are closed the budget will not collect probably 
very much from this new tax component – but will not lose either, as 
this class of personal gains was not taxed before.  
• The lack of coordination across sectors and agencies is a typical 
problem in Romania, which could not be averted on this occasion. 
When they operated the changes to the Fiscal Code, the 
government overlooked the fact that the personal income tax is a 
shared source of revenue for the local governments, out of which 
they receive a fixed percentage. The drop in collection predicted 
immediately after the introduction of the flat tax was going to 
impact local budgets negatively. So in February the government 
decided to intervene with an emergency ordinance and increase 
these percentages significantly. But we see today that the drop 
… but some 
aspects of this 
reform were 
poorly 
managed; some 
gaps in 
coordination will 
create effects in 
the future 
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may not be as severe as initially thought, so it is possible that local 
governments were over-compensated (though any mayor would 
argue that, if this happens, the extra sums barely cover the 
unfunded mandates they have received from the center in the last 
years).  
• Finally, it is good that the government mustered their courage and 
made the long-postponed step to increase the tax on agricultural 
land, from the symbolic sum of about 30 Eurocents/ha/year, to an 
average of about 10 Euro/ha/year. However, with no reasonable 
explanation, they decided to withhold this sum at the central 
budget, although property taxes have always been own local 
government revenues in Romania. Not only does this measure 
contradict the principles of decentralization upheld by the ruling 
coalition, marking a reversal of trend and clashing with the draft 
legislative package scheduled to be sent to the Parliament this fall 
– but it may create perverse and uncontrollable effects too. Mayors 
have threatened that, if the measure is not abolished and they do 
not get their money back, they will propose the Local Councils to 
incorporate all the agricultural land into the "inhabitable area" of 
the locality, and thus continue to collect the tax at the local level. If 
they do this, a lot of zoning plans would become irrelevant and the 
building sprawl much more difficult to control.  
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Agricultural Policy 
 
AGRO POLICIES, ELECTORAL CYCLES AND THE EU 
ACCESSION 
What the current administration can and should do in 
agriculture 
 
If we look at its broad policy objectives, the current Romanian 
government that took office in December 2004 has laid out one of the 
clearest programs after 1990 regarding agriculture. However, the 
measures announced for implementing this strategy are not so clear, 
and some are inappropriate. Moreover, no difference is made in the 
governing program between the pre-accession years of this mandate 
(i.e., until 2007 or 2008) and the post-accession ones, when some things 
will have to change as a result of the need to comply fully with the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It is still not too late to inform all 
beneficiaries, large and small, about the changes that will occur from 
2007 on, especially in the regime of subsidies. The new minister may 
have referred precisely to this when he announced the subsidization 
will have to change starting with the fall of 2005, but since no details 
were offered it is hard to tell.  
The new property laws 
The pro-active attitude of the new cabinet is apparent from the first 
point in their governing program: the completion of the process to 
restitute land property to previous owners. A legislative package was 
already drafted to this effect, including amendments to all major 
property acts passed after 1990 – Law 18/1991 (the land law) and Law 
1/2000 (the “law of Vasile Lupu”) – in order to remove part of the vast 
quantities of pork and barrel included. Also on the list are amendments 
to Law 7/1996 (cadastre), updating Law 54/1998 (the legal circulation 
of land), and a new law to speed up in courts the cases related to 
land property restitution. It is very encouraging that all these changes 
incorporate a lot of feed back from practitioners and that they were 
put up for public consultation before being sent to the Parliament.  
However, due to the fragile majority in both chambers, it is still possible 
that the new amendments do not pass, unless they are rushed through 
in the same time with the larger package of property restitution on 
which the government intends to follow the riskier path of assuming 
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responsibility2. The foreseeable impact on these laws is not going to be 
high on the short term; the symbolic impact is however important and 
likely to shape the long-term effects of the laws.  
Encouraging family farms 
The second objective of the government’s agricultural policy is to 
“stimulate the transformation of peasant households into commercial 
family farms”, and as a result “develop and consolidate the middle 
class in the Romanian rural society”. If we are to believe the statements 
of the ruling coalition’s leaders, this is in fact the most important 
objective of this strategy. The means by which it will be implemented 
are: the encouraging of land consolidation through exchanges and 
free market transactions, support for livestock farms, and the 
introduction of a life annuity for old peasants who give up their lands. 
There are no specific policy targets on this objective, but it is also true 
that such targets would be very hard to define given the complexity of 
the process to transform peasant households into commercial farms, 
and the deep historical entrenchment of the former in the Romanian 
society.  
The peasant household is characterized by a very imperfect 
integration with the formal agro markets, which themselves are sub 
optimal. For these traditional households the inputs and agro-food 
markets are not essential as long as they rely mainly on self-
consumption; the capital and land markets are fragmented and 
shallow; the low stock of human capital prevents them from using new 
information and technologies; and the labor market is rigid, favoring 
rural underemployment and low productivity. If a strategy to turn 
peasants into farmers is to be successful, all these dimensions have to 
be taken into account.  
The sheer size of the problem that needs to be tackled is impressive 
and singles out Romania among the new EU member countries. Fig. 1 
presents a breakdown of the 4.4 million individual agro units in 
Romania, occupying 8.4 million ha, which means more than half of the 
arable land. As the chart shows, traditional peasant households 
(autarchic and semi-subsistence) represents the vast majority among 
these individual units in terms of area, allowing little room for farms 
producing for the market (c, d, e). All in all, there are only 92,000 
individual farms producing for the market. These two types of 
traditional units identified at the 2002 rural census should be targeted 
with slightly different instruments: “autarchic” households (about 3.4 
million) should be offered early retirement or life annuities for giving up 
land; the “semi-subsistence” households (about 1 million) should be 
offered micro-grants for investments. Both instruments involve public 
funds. The 2005 budget does not have such kind of money earmarked, 
but if a decision is made quickly there is enough time to prepare for 
having them ready in 2006.  
 
                                                 
2 Fast track procedure to cut short the parliamentary debates and go directly 
to the vote on a bill; if it is rejected, the cabinet resigns.  
"The peasant 
issue" – that of 
subsistence 
rural households 
– is still unsolved 
after one 
century and a 
half of attempts 
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Life annuities for peasants older than 60 who agree to sell or lease out 
their land is one of the most debated topics in Romania today. The 
level of compensation proposed by the government is 100€/ha per 
year for selling, and 50€/ha per year for leasing. The problem is, we do 
not know yet if this measure, if implemented, can remain in place after 
Romania’s accession into the EU. What is clear however is that in any 
case it cannot be financed with community funds, before or after 
accession, since the EU has a different scheme with the same purpose 
but different rules: early retirement, applicable not only to land owners 
but also to agro laborers. In this scheme the age limit for becoming 
eligible is lower (55) but the annuity is paid only for a maximum of 15 
years (10 for laborers), and not beyond the age of 75 (which is the 
legal retirement age for agro laborers in the EU). In case the Romanian 
scheme is accepted by the EU, they can both function after 2007, but 
only if the national budget can fully fund the first one. Alternatively, 
they could be implemented in succession, one before and the other 
after joining the EU, in which case a large-scale publicity campaign 
should be initiated as soon as a decision is reached so that Romanian 
peasants understand what the whole plan is and choose the moment 
when they want to opt in.  
Five-year grants up to 1,000€ per year per household will also be 
available after accession as support for semi-subsistence households (b 
type in Fig. 1). But the farmers will have to submit a business plan to 
prove their exploitations are viable in the long run. The corresponding 
measure currently in preparation at the Ministry of Agriculture is the 
“Farmer” Programme to encourage young and better qualified 
people to settle in rural localities. When it comes to be implemented, 
the most serious obstacle will probably be the selection of these young 
families.  
 
Fig. 1. Type of individual agro units, by area
2002 rural census
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Reforming the subsidies 
Under the guise of two new objectives – “efficient allocation of 
budgetary resources for supporting agro producers” and “support for 
selling the products on the market” – the current governments intend 
to continue with the subsidization system inherited from the previous 
administration, operating only marginal adjustments which are not 
necessarily beneficial. The continuity is apparent in terms of both pluses 
and minuses. First, there is a heavier reliance on support for investments 
and a certain movement to align the domestic policies to CAP; but on 
the other hand, the tendency persists to yield easily to the pressure of 
various interest groups, manage the subsidies sloppily and continue 
with measures that utterly contradict the CAP (such as the 
subsidization of irrigations or diesel fuel).  
Although most of the strategies and preambles to the subsidization 
plans implemented after 1999 mentioned explicitly that they were 
CAP-compatible, today we can see that none of them was. And this is 
also true for the measures initiated after December 2004. This is why we 
believe it is inappropriate that, starting in mid 2005, the subsidies paid 
by the Ministry of Agriculture be distributed through the recently 
created Payment Agency, as some officials declared. This would be a 
diversion of human and material efforts from the strategic goals of 
preparing for accession, and a waste of the most limited resource 
today in the process of setting up the institutions for post-accession 
funds: time. Instead, the Agency should run at least one measure 
which is fully compatible with the CAP in order to test and adjust its 
mechanisms. Direct payments, EU-type could be such a measure, if 
due attention were paid to establishing the Integrated Administration 
and Control System (IACS), which is already beyond schedule. Without 
a functioning IACS at the moment of accession there will be no direct 
payments in Romania. This may trigger an absorption crisis, since these 
sums are larger than those for the market support measures. 
This is also true for our national budgets in the last years: a sizable share 
of subsidies come in forms that resemble the EU direct payments, 
which in our case means cash in hand or vouchers for peasants 
(except in 2002 – see Fig. 2). The problem is, none of them meets the 
CAP criteria of eligibility of beneficiaries, monitoring of disbursement 
and timing. For example, the true direct payments in the EU are made 
at the end of the farming year, not at the beginning or during it like in 
Romania, where subsidies became a soft financing instrument for the 
agro season. Moreover, the Romanian vouchers represent a 
subsidization of inputs, which again is not accepted under CAP.  
The Romanian authorities can probably argue that, at least until 2007, 
they need to continue with the vouchers as a “dirty” form of direct 
payments, for many practical reasons. The large diversity of goods and 
services that can be paid for with vouchers ensures that the markets for 
inputs will not be distorted too much. Second, but only off-record, they 
can show that the current voucher system helps to diminish the 
pressure on the budget at sensitive moments of the year (for example 
in the spring of 1999 when Romania was near default; or at the 
The current 
system of 
subsidies is not 
compatible with 
the CAP 
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beginning of 2005 when the situation was uncertain due to the fiscal 
reform). This is so because the voucher clearing mechanism delays the 
actual payment by a number of weeks; even longer delays can 
appear due to the bureaucracy, but nobody complains because 
there are “sweeteners” such as the partial payments included in the 
price of inputs. Without these informal delays, directs payments should 
have been made in March-April, which is not the most comfortable 
period of the year for the state budget.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All the other types of subsidies must be replaced by 2007 with CAP-
compatible ones – in market support, mainly subsidies for cereals, beef 
and sugar – or completely terminated – such as subsidies for pork, 
poultry, and for inputs like diesel and irrigations. It is therefore obvious 
how inappropriate it was to reintroduce in 2005 the price subsidy for 
diesel fuel, courageously eliminated by the previous government, and 
the subsidies for pork and poultry, which do not exist in the EU. Looking 
at the main beneficiaries of these measures, which are the large 
industrial producers, we can infer the golden rule of thumb that their 
lobby is more effective the more the political leaders are beginners 
and the top civil servants in the Ministry old and experienced. In March 
2005 the Agro Producers Association was formed, bringing together 40 
large agro business operating 350,000 hectares. In consequence the 
struggle for public subsidies between large companies and small farms 
can only become harsher until 2007, when as a result of joining the EU 
the balance between the two types of agro units will be imposed by 
the agreements reached at the European level.  
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Promoting rural development 
Rural development is the second pillar of CAP in the Union, swallowing 
almost as much money as the agricultural pillar itself. In Romania the 
notion was included in the governing program under the label 
“development and modernization of villages”. The proposed actions 
are a list of the main measures included in SAPARD, plus a number of 
specific elements aimed at facilitating the absorption of the 
community funds. The emphasis is on infrastructure and diversifying the 
rural economy.  
Fig. 3. The state of accessing SAPARD funds, March 2005 
Measures Applications Contracts Payments 
made, mil 
€ 
% 
allocation 
used 
1.1. Processing and 
marketing 
213 149 4077 38 
2.1. Rural infrastructure 1354 607 26403 87 
4.2. Technical assistance 16 13 37 25 
3.1. Investments in 
exploitations 
364 268 702 15 
3.4. Diversifying activities 309 201 105 3 
4.1. Professional training 1 1 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rate of success in contracting SAPARD funds is very uneven across 
the accredited measures. The most sought after are the rural 
infrastructure projects (see Fig. 3), and the authorities seem resigned to 
this situation and tacitly accepting that the other allocations will not be 
used fully. After three measures were certified in 2002 (1.1., 2.1. and 
Sapard funds used, % of the total allocation, March 2005
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4.2.) and three more at the end of 2003 (3.1., 3.4. and 4.1.), the overall 
rate of absorption remains low: 74% for the money allocated in 2000 
and 2001 on the first three measures, and 9% for the money allocated 
in 2002 for the other three.  
A thorough analysis of the factors that influence the success of SAPARD 
is urgently needed, since the problems the system is facing now are 
likely to be reproduced on a larger scale with the biggest sums coming 
after accession. This analysis should focus not only on the issue of the 
absorption rate, which is a very imperfect success indicator, but also 
on the impact of implementing the projects, i.e. the magnitude of 
structural transformations taking place in the rural area as a result of 
the EU assistance. However, since a good rate of absorption is a 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition of success, quick action 
must be taken to reduce the share of funds not contracted by the end 
of 2006, because they cannot be used after this date. Equally 
important is the proper functioning of the SAPARD Agency until 2007, 
on both its operational and monitoring functions. The latter was rather 
overlooked so far, especially in infrastructure projects, which partly 
explains the higher rate of utilization of funds on this component – and 
may announce future problems of integrity.  
Getting the institutions in place 
There is a special objective dedicated to “improving the institutional 
framework” aimed at preparing Romania for implementing the CAP. 
The key components of this framework are both new bodies such as 
the Payment Agency, the Management Authority for Orientation 
Funds, the Agro Accounting Info Network; and existing ones like the 
Veterinary and Food Safety Agency, Agro Consultancy Agency and 
the system of agro statistics.  
While the veterinary and fito-sanitary components are more or less on 
schedule, other components are in various states of delay that 
threaten to become critical. The layout of the Payment Agency was 
only defined by ministerial regulation in February 2005 and it is not 
functioning yet. The same situation with the Integrated Administration 
and Control System (IACS), which is part of this Agency: if by the time 
of accession it is not in place and fully functional the market support 
measures and the direct payments cannot be made (all eligible plots 
of land need to be identified beforehand). IACS relies on a number of 
technical sub-systems such as the one for registering plots, livestock 
and the rights of payment. Their implementation requires time, 
investments and proper training, which cannot be done in haste at the 
end of 2006.  
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Regional Development 
 
CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE? 
Regional disparities in Romania and the effect of 
moving closer to the EU 
 
In Romania the transition to market and democracy was more difficult 
and traumatic than in other CEE countries due to the severe distortions 
inherited from the communist regime. The attempts to distribute more 
or less evenly industries and wealth over the whole territory of Romania, 
guided from Bucharest and constituting explicit policy for many 
decades before 1989, led to perverse effects: over-investment in 
prestige projects and under-investment in infrastructure and human 
capital; industrial white elephants; the emergence of mono-industrial 
towns or areas, relying on a single large company for their whole socio-
economic life; and a network of cross-subsidies between branches 
and regions that made impossible to know what was economically 
viable and what not. Moreover, beneath the surface of this formal 
socialist economy paraded as modern and booming, the social 
structure of "deep Romania" has endured more or less unaltered, 
having at its core the autarchic peasant household. Semi-survival, 
traditional agriculture on small plots was practiced by the members of 
agro cooperatives alongside – or at the expense of – the official state 
agriculture; but also by a large proportion of the industrial workers who 
were in fact semi-urbanized peasant commuters, more attached to 
their land and garden that to the factory that paid their salary.  
The economic restructuring with partial dezindustrialization after 1990 
was an obligatory stage in which some of these distortions and over-
investments were eliminated. Without the pressure of international 
financial institutions or the EU, things would have probably gone in the 
same direction, only more slowly and hesitantly, with all the political 
slippages that usually accompany such a process in societies 
incompletely modernized (and which were not entirely avoided in 
Romania anyway). Today, after fifteen years of transition and ten years 
of approaching the EU on fast forward, a number of conclusions are 
discernible regarding the relative potential of development of different 
Romanian regions. Summarizing the factors that determine the wealth 
and dynamism of our regions, one can say that: 
• Old, historic disparities in development level could not be erased by 
the massive efforts and investments, lasting decades, under 
Communism. The regime only managed to create an appearance 
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of social homogeneity and some unviable economic units which 
disappeared as soon as the protecting glass case was removed. 
• The divergence between regions after 1990, apparent especially 
during economic booms – the richest ones grow faster than the 
poor ones in good years, and decrease less during recessions – is 
therefore largely a reflection of the pre-Communist times.  
• Apart from inherited development and its pre-requisites, additional 
factors influencing regional growth seem to be today: geographic 
location (the closer to the Western border, the better); and easy 
access (the cases of Bucharest, or the city of Constanţa at the 
Black Sea; or sub regions that grow faster than others within the 
same region).  
• Demographics will matter in the future in a way that is completely 
new for Romania, reproducing trends that occurred after World 
War II in some parts of Western Europe. And it is not only the general 
population decline which we share with many EU member 
countries – but the pronounced aging process, probably followed 
by depopulation, in vast rural areas of Southern Romania. 
Economically such a process makes some sense, but many social 
problems will have to be solved along the way for which we are not 
prepared. 
All these factors are exogenous to governance and lead to the 
pessimistic conclusion that, ultimately, the patterns of development in 
Romania are largely pre-determined. There are no success stories of 
policy interventions that managed to change them between 1989, in 
Romania or elsewhere in CEE – and such success stories are even less 
likely to appear after Communism, when the scope and instruments of 
social intervention were substantially reduced. The hope to spread 
around development with the help of large infrastructure projects, so 
much discussed in Romania today, is overblown and a bit naïve. 
Because ultimately they will be prioritized so as to serve economic 
activities where they already exist and feel constrained by the existing 
network of transportation and utilities. It can hardly be otherwise, since 
the theory of planting highways in backward regions in order to 
generate development is a poor investment strategy in terms of cost-
benefit, and is in general honored more in rhetoric than in reality, 
especially in a poor country like Romania.  
In other words, development is too complex and elusive to be 
generated top-down by government policies, even well-meaning 
ones. It resembles a living body easy to destroy but hard to regenerate 
from scratch. Creating a favorable environment for it is one thing the 
governments can do, and here we come to the orthodox package of 
competitiveness, functional bureaucracy, low corruption and stable 
institutions. But there is precious little beyond this that has proved useful 
in the long run. Moreover, the laws and the business environment are in 
general determined at the national level, so there is not much a mayor 
or county councilor from a poor region can do to push things in the 
right direction. (The converse is not true, however: they can do a lot of 
harm if they want; so a useful advice would be, don't ruin with wrong-
Geography 
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headed local policies the little growth that is happening naturally in 
your community).  
Therefore development appears to be easier to approach as an 
object of measurement and evaluation by analysts than a policy 
target for decision makers. A Hungarian economist has calculated 
recently that in our region development advances from West to East at 
a pace of about 20-30 km per year. If we accept this sketchy but 
beautifully graphic description, take as starting point the Austrian 
border and initial moment the late eighties, when Hungary launched its 
pro-market reforms, the sustained growth of the Western parts of 
Romania in the last years fits well this model of a progressing wave.  
On the other hand, the truly historical novelty in our part of the world is 
the process of EU accession. There has never been in Central and 
Eastern Europe such a consistent and institutionalized foreign 
intervention before, with technical, financial and political components, 
and with the declared aim of development. The crescendo of 
assistance in the last decade will reach a climax with Romania's 
accession in 2007. If there is something that can alter the old patterns 
of regional development, probably here is the hope. Which does not 
mean that things will run on automatic pilot once Romania joins the 
Union and money starts flowing in even larger quantities. For every 
Ireland which used intelligently the EU funds to shape up itself and 
become a modern country, there is a Southern Italy which did not, 
burying them in useless projects and reinforcing the closed and cronyist 
traditional society. It will be our choice and responsibility to follow one 
of these two models, because Europe can provide money and some 
safeguards that not all of them will be stolen, but cannot guarantee 
the impact of their spending in the deep Romania.  
An extra glimmer of hope comes from the opening of the European 
borders for Romanian citizens in 2002. This was arguably one of the 
most significant changes for ordinary Romanians in the decade and a 
half of transition, with a positive impact still hard to quantify. The 
massive circulatory migration between Romania and Western Europe 
in the last three years has brought into the country more money than 
the official assistance through pre-accession instruments or FDI3. There 
are signs that fortunately the benefits from this migration are relatively 
evenly distributed by social categories and regions, which contributes 
to convergence; this was not the case before the Schengen visas were 
abolished.  
Patterns of development 
GDP/cap rose in Romania in real terms, but unevenly across the eight 
regions (Fig. 1). Region 8 (Bucharest-Ilfov), with its special profile, 
benefited the most, followed by the Western parts of the country and 
Constanţa county (which pushes up the average in South East). Since 
1998 Region 8 has probably doubled its GDP/cap, which is remarkable 
                                                 
3 SAR is currently carrying out a research project on the topic on migration to 
EU and its effects on local communities; a report illustrated with case studies 
will be published in the fall.  
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progress: adjusting up the numbers with the Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP), it approaches rapidly the EU average. The average salary 
displays the same trend (Fig. 2), though less pronounced: salaries in NW 
and the Central region are not as high as the GDP level would predict, 
and this gap may be explained in many ways, from the concentration 
of the state mining sector in SW to the variable share of the 
underground economy across regions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. GDP/cap in the eight NUTS2 regions
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Demography reflects the changing socio-economic conditions in 
Romania during transition. There is a general decline of population, 
which is nothing new, due to the falling birthrate and emigration. The 
last factor plays an uncertain role in the long term, however: if most of 
those who left to work in the EU will return, the effect will be temporary; 
but if many of them settle down for good in Western Europe, statistics 
will register a substantial one-off drop in population in the early years of 
the decade. In any case, we can conclude that: 
• The poorer North and East are more affected currently by the 
outflow of people, these being areas of highest external and 
internal emigration 
• There was a reverse in the general, secular trend in urbanization 
during the transition, especially between 1994-2000, as many urban 
dwellers moved (back, most likely) to villages (Fig. 3). This was a 
subsistence strategy of blue collar workers confronted with massive 
industrial restructuring. Things look as if the forced urbanization 
under Communism led to a backlash immediately after the regime 
collapse. This stage is probably over.  
The population aging is obvious especially in South and South West, 
where it is close to the European average (Fig. 4). Since the younger 
people still around are strongly attracted by the adjacent Region 8 
(primarily Bucharest), a gradual depopulation of these areas is to be 
expected in the future. Which economically makes sense: as the 
previous section of this report shows, the consolidation of land and 
agro economic activities is a must, especially in the Romanian Plain. 
But the changes will be accompanied by social problems which 
require vision, determination and resources to be tackled. The policy of 
Fig. 3. Rural population by region, %
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life annuities for old peasants in exchange for land, recently 
announced by the Ministry of Agriculture, may be such a bold 
measure. But every small detail of implementation must be clarified 
before moving on, in order to avoid the typical Romanian haste and 
lack of coordination in this sensitive domain. The compatibility with the 
European CAP must also be assured if we want to put EU money into 
the scheme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Population by age and region
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Unsurprisingly, the differential in aging trends is also reflected in the 
social dependency rate, which varies by region. Again, the southern 
parts are on top at the pensioners / employee ratio (Fig. 5). 
Demographics and industrial decline have contributed to this result, as 
the Romanian governments were happy all along to camouflage the 
under-employment of people with low qualifications through early 
retirement and migration to the rural. The overall unemployment is 
quite low for a country undergoing massive economic reforms (Fig. 5), 
but this numbers do not account for the fact that many individuals of 
working age are practically unemployed who keep themselves busy 
around the house and the garden.  
The future does not look much better, for the distribution of labor by 
sectors (Fig. 6) and the stock of human capital (Fig. 7) are not 
favorable for sustained development. Actually, Romania should look 
more like Region 8 to come close to the structure of the EU from this 
point of view, and this will not happen soon. In the problem regions it is 
even possible that the EU assistance remain without effect, as it is not 
clear if these communities have enough resources, energy and 
expertise to use it effectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Structure of labour by sectors and regions, 2003
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Fig. 7. Education attainment, 2002
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Republic of Moldova 
 
DILEMMAS IN CHIŞINĂU 
GUAM, Europe and the new trends in regional security 
policy 
 
The shift of NATO borders on the Prut River after Romania became a full 
member in 2003 has not led to any visible changes of Moldovan official 
attitude toward the outside world. It has neither changed the regional 
balance of powers, which has been perpetuated in this region of 
Europe for the last ten years. Not much happened at domestic level 
either. The fact that the borders of the North Atlantic Alliance are only 
100 km away from Chişinău does not seem to affect in any significant 
way the polarized politics of Moldova, considering that the territory 
laying East of Dniestr is being de facto controlled by Russian troops 
together with paramilitary troops of the breakaway regime in Tiraspol.  
Nevertheless, the proliferation of both military and nonmilitary security 
threats in the area, especially due to the existence of an offshore 
criminal zone controlled by unconstitutional forces, raises concerns 
regarding the security and stability of this region not only for Moldova, 
but also for neighboring areas.  
During the 2004 Istanbul summit, NATO formulated a clear strategy 
seeking to continuously adjust the Alliance to its new responsibilities, to 
the geopolitical changes that have prompted the war against 
terrorism as the number one priority, and to the existing cleavages 
generated by the Iraq war within the Alliance. As a general line, NATO 
decided to extend its area of responsibility according to American 
priorities, as USA remains the main supporter and financer of the 
organization. This big leap from the North-Atlantic to Middle Asia left 
Moldova again in an area of secondary interest for NATO. Any hopes 
regarding possible security arrangements for the South-West region of 
the former Soviet Union have thus once more proved vain.  
However, recent geo-strategic and political developments, focused 
on making the Black Sea area more secure, offer interesting 
perspectives to the Republic of Moldova, in its quest for re-establishing 
its territorial integrity and for obtaining sustainable guarantees. New 
NATO members, such as Romania and Bulgaria, but also old ones like 
Turkey, could play an important, if not decisive role, in designing new 
partnerships in the region. The transnational character of most of the 
threats stemming from this area, such as arms smuggling, human 
Romania's 
joining of 
NATO has not 
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Chişinău 
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trafficking, proliferation of WMDs, as well as organized crime possibly 
associated with terrorism, require a more established and sustainable 
cooperation of those states affected by these phenomena. The 
reshaping of security arrangements in the Black Sea area is still at its 
beginning, however, and only time will show how effective this quest of 
extending security guarantees outside the traditional area of 
responsibility of NATO allies could be. 
In the meanwhile, the reactivation of older regional security 
arrangements in the post-soviet space seems to become a new trend 
in the attempt to guarantee collective security. In this respect, the 
GUAM summit in Chişinău in April 22 opened a new stage in 
transforming this organization into an institution capable of promoting 
the interests of its member states in their delicate relationship with 
Russia, as well as in their efforts to re-integrate in the Euro-Atlantic 
community. 
GUAM: the stage of self-assertion 
The relative short existence of GUAM as a regional organization can be 
divided in two stages. The initial one begun eight or nine years ago, 
when four newly independent states – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan 
and Moldova – had the initiative to coordinate their efforts in order to 
consolidate their energy and economic independence, as well as their 
sovereignty, by developing their bilateral relations and by 
strengthening their relationship with the Euro-Atlantic community.  
This initiative came as a reaction to the inefficiency and inability of the 
Russian-dominated CIS to solve any of the serious problems faced by 
these states. Such problems related especially to the one-sided 
economic and energy dependency on Eastern markets, as well as to 
the territorial separatism and the presence of foreign military troops on 
their territory, which perpetuated a chronic situation of uncertainty 
and insecurity. The breakaway regimes had created – with tacit 
Russian approval – criminal offshore zones, which became with time 
the source of all kind of military and non-military threats and hindered 
the normalization and stabilization of the domestic environment in 
these countries. 
This first stage of GUAM existence was seriously marked by former soviet 
leaders such as Shevarnadze, Kuchma, Aliev senior and Luchinsky, with 
their specific traditional attitude towards the relationships within the 
new organization, as well as towards international problems more 
generally. As representatives of the former nomenklatura, these leaders 
promoted a very vague foreign policy, by balancing all the time 
between Moscow, Washington and Brussels, while preserving equal 
distance from both West and East. This proved to be an unproductive 
policy, as it managed to preserve uncertainty in these countries and 
did not succeed in attracting Western interest for this region. GUAM 
has thus failed in creating for itself any efficient mechanisms of action, 
and most of the decisions met by the high representatives of member 
states remained only on paper. As such, the new organization 
increasingly resembled to a smaller CIS.  
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Starting with 2003 the domestic situation in most of the GUAM member 
states changed radically. One by one, these countries announced 
that their major strategic goal was to get back to Europe, and 
adjusted accordingly their foreign policies in order to strengthen their 
relations with both NATO and the EU. Geopolitical changes also 
occurred after 2003. The borders of the Transatlantic Alliance shifted to 
the East, touching the western borders of the former Soviet Union, and 
became the immediate neighbor of Russia in the Baltic Sea area. At 
the same time, the Russian Federation declared its “immediate 
neighborhood” as an area of special interest, while the United States 
affirmed its clear intentions of stabilizing the situation in the Black Sea 
and Caspian Sea basins in order to consolidate its presence there and 
to increase the efficiency of its antiterrorism instruments. Equally 
important, the USA shows an increasing interest in these areas because 
it seeks to ensure safe access to the important energy resources in this 
region. The EU interest in this sub-regional organization has also 
increased since 2003, as shown by the “Wider Europe” strategy, as well 
as by the enhanced European efforts for securing its new Eastern 
borders.  
The domestic developments in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, 
coupled with the geopolitical changes that occurred in the area, have 
generated the need for a stronger cooperation between GUAM 
member states. This regional project was re-launched also because of 
the recent rapprochement between the GUAM member states, based 
on their common long-term strategic interests, as well as common 
threats towards their sovereignty and independence. All these factors 
have led to the start of a new stage in the existence of GUAM.  
The major goals of GUAM were announced with the occasion of the 
summit in Chişinău: consolidating the independence and sovereignty 
of its member states by countering territorial separatism, creating a 
free trade area, ensuring a higher level of energy security and exiting 
the Russian sphere of influence. Of course, none of these countries is 
able to effectively promote and defend its interest by itself, and 
assuring national security within the existent environment is impossible 
without international support from strategic partners. Such problems 
could only be solved within greater alliances and with the support of 
important international actors.  
The GUAM format: possible changes and reactions 
The final configuration of GUAM depends to a great extent on its 
geopolitical dimension. For the time being, GUAM is a voluntary 
association of states from South Caucasus up to Ukraine (with the 
exception of Armenia), which all remain CIS members, while at the 
same time trying to promote a pro-European foreign policy, as well as 
cooperation with Western international organizations. The withdrawal 
of Uzbekistan from this association was predictable in this sense, 
because of the incompatibility between President Karimov’s policies 
and the democratic values, embraced – at least according to official 
declarations – by the rest of the GUAM members.  
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GUAM has therefore the chance to stand today as an important 
element of this regional system, which seeks to guarantee security and 
stability in the new Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area. The 
organization is currently going through a re-configuration process, and 
much will depend on its cooperation with neighboring states, NATO 
member states and the Alliance as a whole, as well as the EU.  
Romania is starting to play an increasingly visible and important role in 
the region. Since the 2004 November elections, the newly elected 
President Traian Băsescu has been promoting a clear and structured 
foreign policy with regard to Romania’s role in modern Europe. In this 
respect, the stabilization of the Black Sea area by countering territorial 
separatism and settling the frozen conflicts in the region has been 
announced as one of the top priorities of Romanian foreign policy. 
Bucharest becomes therefore one of the most important strategic 
partners of GUAM member states.  
There is no big secret that the US have contributed since 1996-1997 to 
the creation of this organization and supported it politically. Therefore, 
it is natural that GUAM member states think of the United States as of 
an essential strategic partner in their quest of consolidating 
democracy and independency, as well as that of regaining territorial 
integrity in the case of Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The 
partnership between GUAM and the US is based on their common 
interests in consolidating democracy and securitizing the Eastern 
European space.  
The EU might gradually also start to formulate a more clear and 
affirmative foreign policy towards this area, as an element of its still 
underdeveloped Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
hindered by the lack of mechanisms to implement any decision. 
However, for the time being, there is no partner other than the United 
States able to support these countries and counter the neo-imperial 
Russian tendencies. 
The Russian Federation is one of the most important factors in this 
equation, and may also influence to a great extent the future shape of 
GUAM. Moscow reacts negatively to any initiative of the former “sister 
republics”, which has not been previously agreed in Kremlin. Such 
reactions become completely irrational whenever these new 
independent states try to assert their sovereignty and consolidate their 
efforts in order to promote their common interests. This is a symptom of 
the Russian post-imperial syndrome, which seems to be widely spread 
in Eurasia. Most of the Russian politicians, commentators or analysts, 
see this effort of re-launching GUAM as a way of extending the 
Western sphere of influence in what they perceive as the “immediate 
neighborhood” of Russia. This attitude shows a certain inferiority 
complex of most Russian leaders, as well as distrust in their Western 
partners. Indeed, since 2001 Russia has become an important partner 
of the US in its fight against terrorism. At the same time, Russia remains a 
nuclear power and is one of the key players in the efforts to counter 
the proliferation of WMDs or WMD’s components. These are important 
reasons for which the United States tends to be sensible to what 
Post-imperial 
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Kremlin leaders have to say on certain issues and promotes a 
balanced policy in what concerns the support given to the new 
neighbors of NATO and the EU. 
The last round of NATO enlargement has generated a pretty strong 
Russian reaction, as Moscow is trying to put some distance between 
itself and the West by creating a belt of former soviet republics around 
its borders. These republics are seen by Russian leaders as quiet, docile 
elements in the wider geopolitical quest of creating a new order within 
the Eurasian space.  
Ukraine plays an important role in this game. Recent domestic political 
developments have shown that Ukraine is not willing to play docile for 
Moscow any more, and Russia cannot restore its empire without 
Ukraine, as nationalistic leaders in Moscow would like. On the other 
hand, wider Europe cannot remain stable either without Ukraine. Since 
coming to power, the pro-Western President Yuschcenko has been 
declaring Ukraine’s interest in joining the Euro-Atlantic institutions and 
has shown the will to take a decisive stance in the settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict in Moldova, which indicates a radical geopolitical 
change in the region. 
Finally, but not least, the structure and future of GUAM depends to a 
large extent on the ability of its member states to assume responsibility 
for guaranteeing stability and security in the region, to mobilize their 
efforts in order to address common problems, as well as to show 
solidarity and efficiency when promoting their interests in front of 
international actors active in the region.  
Moldova – The Immediate Neighbor of NATO and the EU 
The effects of Romania joining the EU in 2007 will be beneficial for 
GUAM, and especially for the Republic of Moldova, as they would 
become the immediate neighbors of an influential and important 
centre of power. This should enhance dialogue, economic partnerships 
and bilateral relations. For the time being, the Republic of Moldova is 
placed in Europe’s neighborhood according to the New 
Neighborhood Policy of the European Union, but the fulfillment of the 
EU Action Plan for Moldova would offer this country a real chance to 
step into a different stage in its relationship with the EU. 
However, the shift of EU borders on the Prut river will most probably not 
generate immediate positive effects for the Moldovan Republic. 
Romania has already been a NATO member for more than one year, 
but the fact that the border of North-Atlantic Alliance is only 100 km 
away from Chişinău did not bring many changes until now. It has 
clearly not helped in addressing the major problem of Transnistria, a 
“black hole” and a source of both military and human security threats 
in Eastern Moldova. The normalization of Moldova-Romania 
relationships, the unconditional support offered by Romania in 
Moldova’s quest to join the EU, as well as the positive involvement of 
Romania in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict have created 
the premises of a closer involvement of NATO and the EU in Chişinău’s 
problems.  
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The possibility of Ukraine joining NATO should also be taken into 
account. Since Yuschenko entered office, there have been voices 
saying this might be possible through a very expedient, special 
procedure. In any case, provided that Ukraine maintains its pro-
Western orientation within a rather stable political environment at 
domestic level, Moldova and Ukraine could be dealt with as a group 
by the EU and NATO. Moldova should nevertheless also continue its 
individual path towards Europe, in order to make sure that its interests 
would not be hurt by possible radical foreign policy changes of its 
partners. 
Moldova has not yet formulated clear directions for its future 
relationship with NATO. A natural step in developing this relation would 
be to shift from the current PfP Framework, which has been rendered 
obsolete with time, to a NATO-Moldova individual cooperation plan 
adapted to the present geopolitical circumstances, as well as to 
Moldova’s intentions to join the Euro-Atlantic structures. Such a plan 
should contain a special chapter regarding the settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict, as well as a chapter regarding the assistance 
provided by the Allies for the normalization of the situation of all “frozen 
conflicts” in South-East Europe and South Caucasus. NATO remains the 
only security organization in the area, which may have the flexibility 
and experience, as well as the infrastructure necessary to guarantee 
security in a region, which is still far from being stabilized.  
Unfortunately, the Moldovan political class elite remains hostage to old 
soviet-time stereotypes and seems attracted to simple and irrelevant 
attitudes, such as the idea of the permanent neutrality of Moldova, 
stated within the Constitution. This constitutes a formal barrier towards 
a closer relation with NATO. The principle of Moldovan neutrality was 
embraced by the domestic political elite in the early 1990s, and was 
turned into official foreign policy by the Agrarian Democratic Party 
(ADP) in 1994. The ADP and the coalition governing the country at that 
time proved unable to understand the international developments in 
Europe and promoted almost exclusively the integration into CIS. 
Indeed, during the Cold War, this idea of neutrality represented a 
compromise between great powers interested in maintaining the 
balance of power in Europe, and helped the young Moldovan state to 
explain its refusal to join the CIS Collective Security Agreement. 
However, neutrality is not relevant any more under the new 
geopolitical circumstances, as it only makes such states fall into a 
“grey zone of indifference”. Moreover, the idea of neutrality ended in 
serving as an excuse for post-soviet political elites, who were not willing 
– or able – to take decisive decisions to ensure the military security of 
the Moldovan state. As long as Moldova does not revise its neutrality 
status, it will remain squeezed between East and West, with no real 
prospect of escaping this dilemma. Joining NATO and getting closer to 
the EU can only happen when the Moldovan political class 
understands that NATO is nothing else than an institution guaranteeing 
security for its member countries. 
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GUAM and the Breakaway Statelets 
All GUAM member states, except Ukraine, face serious threats to their 
sovereignty because of breakaway statelets functioning on their 
territories. The Republic of Moldova was the first of these countries, 
which was provided an offer by its GUAM partners. This offer consisted 
in the seven principles (steps) announced by President Yuschcenko 
during the Chişinău summit. Unfortunately, this initiative was not very 
welcome, as it did not provide for a clear, coherent plan, but rather for 
a set of principles, which should guide the settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict. This actually proved that the Kyiv administration 
had no clear concept on how to address this frozen conflict. Just a few 
weeks later, it was made clear by some well-known commentators 
from Moldova and abroad that this initiative was nothing more than an 
effort of certain interest groups from President Yuschcenko’s circle to 
distort the settlement process and maintain the status quo of 
uncertainty at the Ukrainian border with Moldova. At the same time, 
Ukraine seems to try and affirm itself as an undisputed leader of GUAM, 
taking unilateral initiatives in solving the internal problems of other 
member states, without prior consultation with the state concerned.  
A general conclusion would be that Moldova should come up as soon 
as possible with a concrete plan for the settlement of the Transnistrian 
conflict. This would require a coherent strategy, based on principles, 
but also on a comprehensive and realistic list of available resources. 
The strategy should also refer to the instruments needed and the 
actions planned for reaching the territorial and political integrity of the 
Moldovan state. In order to achieve this, Moldova also needs a 
strategic partnership, which would help her counter the negative 
Russian interference in Transnistria.  
No matter what, there are a few preconditions that have to be met in 
order to settle this conflict. A first precondition refers to closing the 
Moldo-Ukrainian border on the Transnistrian segment. Second, Russian 
troops should withdraw immediately and unconditionally from the 
region and the composition of peacekeeping troops on the cease-fire 
line should be revised. Thirdly, a new negotiating format should be 
implemented to replace the existing defective pentagonal format, 
which only contributed to freezing the conflict. 
In this respect, the recent declaration of OSCE Ambassador to 
Moldova, William Hill, that Transnistrian separatists offer economic 
benefits to regional elites, is of much significance. This is actually a 
phenomenon that needs no proof any more. President Voronin himself 
referred repeatedly to the efforts made by Transnistrian leaders to pay 
money in order to assure a safe environment for organized illegal 
business. These leaders actually need the support of certain influential 
circles so that the status-quo at the Moldo-Ukrainian border is 
preserved, as this is their main financing source. This fact was proved 
by certain such Ukrainian and Russian circles, who oppose any 
Moldovan initiative of settling the conflict. Organized crime groups are 
also interested in preserving this off-shore criminal zone, which they use 
for money laundering, as well as human and goods trafficking. 
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The Republic of Moldova and its European prospects 
The well-known analyst Vladimir Socor declared recently that the EU 
integration of the Republic of Moldova remains a distant perspective, 
because Moldova is unattractive for the EU today due to its defective 
governance during the last fifteen years. It is clear indeed that there 
are still many changes needed in order to make the Republic of 
Moldova attractive for the EU. However, GUAM could now play the 
role of a second “Visegrad Group” under the new geopolitical 
circumstances, which would bring its member states in corpore closer 
to the European Union.  
For the time being, it is much clearer what the Republic of Moldova 
should NOT do if it wants to avoid any other difficulties in joining the EU. 
First of all, there is a risk that the Moldovan political elite continue to 
see this rapprochement process to EU as a rather diplomatic one, or as 
an exclusive foreign policy process. Secondly, there is also the danger 
of adopting a pure bureaucratic, centralist way of implementing 
action plans, while excessively politicizing Moldova’s Europeanization. 
At the same time, there is a tendency to overestimate Moldova’s 
capacity to implement these plans in a very short time, which actually 
indicated the how superficial the attitude of the political elite is with 
respect to the complexity of its commitments toward Brussels. 
The major problem when talking about Moldova’s EU integration 
consists in creating the adequate internal premises that would allow 
the Moldovan society to embrace the democratic European values 
and become a modern, Western-like society. This would need again a 
clear and comprehensive strategy, which would underline some of the 
key economic, social and political steps to be taken in the immediate 
future. However, restructuring the economy would need foreign 
investment, and Moldova is not yet very attractive to foreign investors, 
while the financial European support comes only as assistance, and 
not as investment. At the same time, Moldova remains an electoral, 
rather declarative democracy, and needs time to become a 
functional democracy. The Moldovan society is only at the stage of 
trying to establish rule of law, an independent justice and a free, 
accountable mass media. These are only some of the many elements, 
which require serious efforts on behalf of the Moldovan society, based 
on a coherent strategy and on clear, achievable goals. Unfortunately, 
there is not much progress to be observed in this direction, while the 
exaggerated optimism of Moldovan officials does not look very 
promising. The Republic of Moldova together with the other GUAM 
states need to concentrate all their efforts to transform this vicious 
circle of unsettled problems and uncertainty into a virtuous circle, 
which would allow them to return to the European family.  
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